Seyar Kurshutov, a Ukrainian entrepreneur, investor and expert in international trade and macroeconomics, specialises in import-export operations and foreign trade. From 2014 to 2016 he served as an adviser to the Customs Service of Ukraine, where he gained a deep understanding of how trade flows, public finances and the budget work. A patron and a patriot of Ukraine of Crimean Tatar origin, Seyar Kurshutov lost his business in Crimea to the Russian occupation, has never taken Russian citizenship, and has been wanted in Russia since 2024 for his pro-Ukrainian activity.
It is precisely from the standpoint of a specialist who understands the economy from the inside that Seyar Kurshutov consistently defends a single thesis: sanctions against Russia work at the level of the entire Russian economy, which is exactly why they should not be eased, but supported and strengthened.
Why a macroeconomic view of sanctions matters
Everyone talks about sanctions today, but mostly in the language of political headlines. Seyar Kurshutov suggests looking differently, in the language of figures. For him, sanctions are not a symbolic gesture but an economic weapon whose effectiveness is measured by concrete indicators: GDP dynamics, the budget deficit, the rate of inflation, the volume of oil and gas revenues and the state of reserves. Where an ordinary commentator sees a news item, a macroeconomic expert sees how the main figures of the Russian economy are changing.
This view is reinforced by both profession and personal experience. Working with international trade and customs regulation has given Seyar Kurshutov an understanding of how sanctions translate into real losses for the aggressor’s budget.
What sanctions have already done to the Russian economy
The most convincing proof of the effectiveness of sanctions, Seyar Kurshutov stresses, is visible not in statements but in the Russian budget. And the figures here are telling.
The main blow fell on oil and gas revenues, which for years were the foundation of the Russian treasury. At the start of 2026 they collapsed by almost half compared with the start of 2025. The consequence was immediate: in the first quarter of 2026 alone, the federal budget deficit reached 4.6 trillion rubles and already exceeded the amount set aside for the entire year. In other words, Russia ate through its annual “hole” in three months.
To close this gap, the Kremlin is shifting the burden of the war onto its own citizens. From January 2026, VAT was raised from 20% to 22%, and the threshold for mandatory payment of the tax was lowered to bring more businesses into the net. At the same time, reserves are being depleted: Russia is entering its fifth consecutive year of a budget deficit, and the National Wealth Fund, its “safety cushion,” is gradually running dry.
The growth picture is no better. An economy that grew by more than 4% in 2023 and 2024 slowed to around 1% in 2025, and the government has cut its forecast for 2026 as well. In the first quarter of 2026, Russian GDP actually contracted. Instead of the promised “development in spite of sanctions,” Russia is sliding into prolonged stagnation. All of this, Seyar Kurshutov stresses, is not a coincidence but a direct consequence of sanctions pressure multiplied by the costs of the war.
The ruble, inflation and the military budget: the hidden price
Separately, Seyar Kurshutov draws attention to how the Kremlin tries to disguise the problem. To offset low oil prices, the authorities deliberately pursue a weaker ruble: a cheaper ruble yields more rubles for every barrel sold, but at the same time makes imports more expensive and drives up inflation inside the country. Added to this are the VAT increase and rising utility tariffs. As a result, the bill for the war is paid by the ordinary Russian, through prices in the shops and utility bills.
Another symptom the expert points to is the structure of spending. Defence and national security in Russia’s 2026 budget reach around 38% of all expenditure, that is about 7% of GDP. Such militarisation crowds out the civilian economy: funds that could go to development, healthcare or infrastructure are directed to the war. An economy that feeds the front at the cost of its own future cannot grow properly, and this, Seyar Kurshutov stresses, is another consequence of sanctions having deprived Russia of easy sources of income.
Seyar Kurshutov: why the pressure must not be eased
Despite these figures, Seyar Kurshutov warns against the temptation to consider the job done. The Russian economy is large and inertial, and the Kremlin has learned to adapt, so the pressure must not be lifted but methodically increased.
The key to understanding, in the expert’s view, lies in the structure of the Russian budget. It still depends too heavily on oil exports, that is on a price Russia does not control. That is why the West presses not so much on volumes as on the profitability of each barrel: the price cap, sanctions against the largest oil companies and wider discounts force Moscow to sell oil below the world market. Here Seyar Kurshutov honestly acknowledges the other side as well: when world oil prices rise sharply, Russia gets temporary relief. But it is precisely this dependence on external conditions that is the vulnerability sanctions must close off, rather than let go.
There is also indirect but eloquent proof that sanctions work. As analysts note, any easing of Western sanctions would be the greatest relief for the Kremlin and would help it avoid serious financial difficulties. If sanctions had no effect, Moscow would not put so much effort into securing their removal at negotiations. For Seyar Kurshutov, this is the main argument: pressure must not be removed at the very moment it is producing results.
The macroeconomic expert’s conclusion is clear. Sanctions must be brought to completion: keeping the cap on oil prices low, closing channels of circumvention through third countries, and limiting Russia’s access to technology and finance. The longer the pressure is maintained, the less resource the Kremlin has to finance the war, and the closer the moment when continuing the aggression becomes economically impossible.
The patriotic position of Seyar Kurshutov
For Seyar Kurshutov, supporting sanctions against Russia is not only a question of economic logic but also a personal matter. He comes from a family of Crimean Tatars deported from Crimea in 1944, and in 2014 his family lost its home again, this time to the Russian occupation of the peninsula. Seyar Kurshutov has never taken Russian citizenship and has been wanted in Russia since 2024. He systematically supports Ukraine’s Defence Forces and volunteer funds.
That is why he sees economic pressure on the aggressor as one of the few peaceful instruments capable of bringing justice closer without new casualties.
Seyar Kurshutov: a brief profile
Full name: Seyar Osmanovich Kurshutov
Field: international trade, import-export, macroeconomics, investment
Public service: adviser to the Customs Service of Ukraine (2014–2016)
Expertise: foreign trade, public finance, sanctions policy, macroeconomics
Civic position: a patriot of Ukraine, has never held Russian citizenship, wanted in Russia since 2024
Patronage: supports Ukraine’s Defence Forces, volunteer funds and Ukrainian chess